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MODELING THE "GRAVITY" OF FOREIGN AID

A Dyadic Panel Analysis on the Impact ofBilateral Aid Commitments on Bilateral
Immigrationfrom 1994 to 2011

By
Miles

D. Williams

ABSTRACT

While research shows policymakers increase bilateral foreign aid commitments in
response to an increase in bilateral immigration, supposedly as a means for reducing the
demand for immigration, the effectiveness of this strategy is given only passing
consideration in the literature. Many doubt this approach's success, but little effort has
been made to empirically justify this doubt. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the
literature and proposes a novel hypothesis. It is argued here that aid, more than simply
failing to promote development quickly enough to reduce the demand for immigration,
functions as a signal of donor wealth. When donors increase the amount of aid they
commit to a given migrant sending country, residents in said country interpret that
increase in aid as an indication of greater economic opportunity in the donor, thereby
influencing would-be migrants' perceptions ofthe balance ofwealth and resources
between donor and recipient, tilting the cost-benefit ratio associated with leaving versus
staying in favor of leaving. Using a dyadic panel dataset for 18 donor countries and 130
aid recipient countries from 1994 to 20 1 1, a gravity-type equation is estimated using both
ordinary least squares and Tobit. The results support this hypothesis, but a number of
caveats are considered. Aid's positive pull on immigration does not appear to be
contingent on past colonial ties, common language, and the aid recipient's political
regime. Furthermore, aid's effect does not appear to be contingent on either bilateral
distance or the restrictiveness of the donor's immigration policies; however, its marginal
effect does seem to slightly diminish in response to an increase in each. Further analysis
reveals a potentially curvilinear relationship between aid and immigration. Implications
for policymakers and future research are discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION

From 1985 to 2014, the net official development assistance (ODA) in current US dollars
received by ODA recipients increased from 6.66 dollars to 22.2 dollars per capita (World
Bank 2016). In absolute terms, this represents an increase from 32.23 billion dollars in
1985 to 161.1 billion dollars in 2014. At the same time, according to the World Bank, as
of 2015 the number of international migrants increased by more than 138 million since
1985 (2016). While this increase, when taken as a percentage of the world population,
represents a mere jump from 2.89 percent to 3.33 percent, the effects of this increase are
no less felt both in destination countries and in migrant-senders. However, despite the
large amounts of aid flowing from donors to developing countries and the simultaneous
flow of large numbers of migrants from aid recipients to donors, the relationship between
migrant flows and foreign aid remains understudied.
Ideally, foreign aid ought to improve economic conditions in migrant-sending
countries, thereby lowering the perceived gains ofleaving one's homeland to take
advantage of more favorable work and living conditions in wealthier developed countries.
For this reason, some state leaders may view foreign aid as a policy tool for curbing the
demand for immigration. Recent work by Bermeo and Leblang (2015) is among the first
to explore the possibility that policymakers in developed countries make use of this
strategy. Their work provides compelling and robust evidence that state leaders increase
aid commitments in response to an increase in the stock of migrants living in their
country from an aid recipient, supposedly as a part of a strategy to promote development
and thereby reduce immigration.
Although, whether aid in fact has such an effect on immigration remains

1

uncertain. The supposed ability of foreign aid to reduce the demand to migrate is
premised upon the assumption that foreign aid sufficiently improves opportunities for
employment, greater income, and higher living standards in the aid recipient, yet little
strong evidence exists to suggest that foreign aid can accomplish this in the short-term.
Nevertheless, while some have expressed skepticism about whether an increase in foreign
aid reduces migrant inflows (Faini and Venturini 1993; de Haas 2007; Bermeo and
Leblang 2015), to this author's knowledge, none have undertaken a systematic empirical
study of the effects of foreign aid on immigration. While researchers Hatzipanayotou and
Michael (2012) have developed a model of donor-recipient relations and have proposed
that an increase in foreign aid sent from a donor country to a recipient country increases
the opportunity cost of immigration, their model remains untested, and their hypothesis is
in the minority. By and large, scholars to date seem to have taken it as a given that aid
has little to no impact on immigration, and therefore they see no need to take the
additional step of thoroughly testing this assumption against empirical evidence.
The lack of serious consideration of the relationship between foreign aid and
immigration furthermore has left an alternative hypothesis unaddressed. Plausibly, an
increase in foreign aid could decrease the perceived opportunity cost of immigration,
thus leading to an increase in migrant inflows. Provided foreign aid fails to sufficiently
improve conditions in an aid recipient-thus failing to make emigration seem less
appealing-aid allocated from a donor (X) could potentially serve as one among many
factors that signal to residents in a recipient (Y) that X has greater resources and greater
wealth than Y. Moreover, supposing foreign aid signals greater wealth in X relative to Y,
one would expect that in response to an increase in foreign aid sent from X to Y,

2

migration from Y to X would increase, ceteris paribus. In other words, bilateral aid may
function as a gravitational-like force, the effect of which is estimable via a "gravity-type"
model similar to others present in the literature (Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets 2014;
Mayda 2010; Ortega and Peri 2009; Gogger and Hansen 2008; Clark, Hatton, and
Williamson 2007)
Furthermore, assuming aid functions as a signal ofa donor's greater wealth in
relation to a recipient, it further seems plausible that aid's positive relationship with
migration may be amplified when a donor and recipient share certain social ties and when
a recipient is a democracy. If a donor and recipient share a colonial past or share a
common language, such ties may improve the likelihood that residents of a recipient are
made aware of changes in aid sent from a donor. Also, if a recipient is a democracy, this
may also improve the chances that residents in a recipient are made aware of changes in
aid sent from a donor because democratic countries may have more open access to
transnational social networks and to information from abroad.
In addition to these hypotheses, I also consider two research questions related to
the interaction of aid commitments with bilateral distance and with donor migration
policy restrictiveness. Bilateral distance and donor migration policy restrictiveness may
impact the marginal effect of bilateral aid, possibly reducing the strength of its
"gravitational" pull on bilateral migrant inflows. At the same time, an increase in
bilateral aid might reduce the marginal impact of bilateral distance and donor migration
policy restrictiveness.
To test these hypotheses and answer these research questions, I develop a model
of donor-recipient relations where, controlling for the effect of numerous covariates as

3

well as donor time-invariant and recipient time-variant fixed effects, the impact of the
natural log of (one plus) bilateral aid commitments from a donor to a recipient at year t-1
on the natural log of (one plus) migrant inflows from an aid recipient to a donor at year t
from 1994 to 2011 is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors
clustered by dyad. I also use Tobit estimation as a check against biased OLS estimates
since the dependent variable (migrant inflows) displays left censoring at 0.
The results from model estimation offer support for the hypothesis that aid
positively predicts an increase in migrant inflows. Controlling for a number of factors
shown in the migration literature to be relevant predictors of immigration, I find that the
effect of aid on migrant inflows is both positive and statistically significant. However,
the results fail to reject the null for the remaining hypotheses, suggesting there is no
additive interaction effect when foreign aid's impact is contingent on a shared colonial
past, a common language, and the political regime in a recipient.
Regarding the research questions, further analysis of the effect of aid, contingent
of bilateral distance and donor migration policy restrictiveness, shows that when the
effect of aid is interacted with these other important factors that push against
immigration, the result is insignificant; however, the marginal effect of aid does seem to
diminish when there is greater bilateral distance between donor and recipient and when a
donor has more restrictive immigration policies. Conversely, contrary to what might
have been expected, an increase in bilateral aid is associated with an increase in the
negative marginal effects of both greater bilateral distance and more restrictive donor
immigration policies. There is, however, a substantial degree of variance in the marginal
impact of each of these factors, suggesting that these results, though interesting, fail to

4

permit stout generalizations. However, these results may hint that foreign aid's positive
impact on bilateral migrant inflows yields diminishing returns. If so, this would suggest
the relationship between foreign aid and immigration is not linear but curvilinear.
To test this possibility, I estimate a quadratic model using both OLS and Tobit
and find that bilateral foreign aid does, indeed, appear to have a curvilinear relationship
with immigration: that is, as aid increases, it at first is associated with an increase in
bilateral migrant inflows, but its effect eventually peaks and is then associated with a
decline in bilateral migrant inflows. Though more research needs to be done to better
understand why the relationship between aid and immigration is quadratic, I offer two
potential explanations: 1) there is a finite pool of potential migrants residing in aid
recipients, and as the number of actual migrants per recipient increases the rate of
migrant outflows eventually slows and levels off, at which point a continued increase in
foreign aid experiences a decline in its marginal effects, thereby increasing. the marginal
impact of other factors that have a negative impact on immigration; 2) donors are more
likely to allocate greater amounts of aid to recipients that are more likely to make good
use of that aid, and by putting aid to good use, the opportunity cost of emigrating for
residents of these recipients favors remaining rather than emigrating, thereby making the
positive pull of bilateral aid seem less important relative to the costs associated with
greater bilateral distance and more restrictive donor immigration policies. It is highly
likely that some combination of these two views can explain the quadratic relationship
between aid and immigration; however, at this point these explanations are merely
speculative.
Following the quantitative analysis, I tum to a selection of cases from my larger
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dataset and consider the validity of my results in the context of this narrower set of data.
I look specifically at France and its bilateral relationship with three of its former North
African colonies (Algeria,Morocco, and Tunisia) and at Britain and its bilateral
relationship with three of its former South Asian colonies (India, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka). I explore the predictive power of the quadratic model estimated during my
quantitative analysis and test the extent to which foreign aid can account for bilateral
migrant inflows in each of these cases. I further consider variation in the impact of aid
for Britain and its former colonies versus France and its former colonies by estimating
models using data from each of these cases.
The results show that the model estimated for the larger dataset offers a fairly
reliable fit for the dependent variable; however, analysis using the smaller set of cases
finds that aid has a statistically significant estimated effect on immigration in the context
of Britain and its South Asian aid recipients but not in the context of France and its North
African aid recipients. These findings suggest that while aid may have a positive impact
on immigration overall, it should not be taken as a given that it will always have such an
effect; concurrently, its potential effect also should not be ignored.
Though limited, the results from this research help to fill a notable gap in the
literature on the factors that motivate bilateral migrant flows. The positive, though
curvilinear, dyadic relationship between foreign aid and immigration revealed by this
analysis represents the first empirically founded answer to the question: When donor

countries increase aid in an effort to curb bilateral immigration, does this aid serve its
intended purpose? This paper also represents one of the first attempts to theoretically
address whether an increase in bilateral foreign aid might lead to an increase in bilateral
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immigration, despite donors' attempts to reduce it. More work remains to be done,
however, before the effect of bilateral aid on immigration is fully understood.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Immigration, an enduring and conflictual issue for countries around the world, has
become especially important to policymakers in developed countries in recent years
(Bermeo and Leblang 2015). Concern that inflows of unskilled immigrant labor will
decrease wages for citizen workers and make it more difficult for natives to find a job
(Borjas 2003), along with security worries and the perception that immigrant populations
threaten a country's cultural identity, have increased in salience in many Western
countries, contributing to the development of far-right (and arguably xenophobic)
political parties across Europe (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012).
A recent 2016 Pew Research Center survey of individuals living in the US and in
several European countries suggests that negative sentiment toward immigrants is
particularly prevalent in Europe (Drake and Poushter 2016). While the results from the
survey indicate that only 7 percent of Americans think increasing numbers of races,
ethnicities, and nationalities makes their country a worse place to live, in Spain, which
reports the lowest level of negative sentiment toward such sources of diversity in
comparison to the other European countries included in the survey, 22 percent of
respondents think more races, ethnicities, and nationalities makes their country a worse
place to live. Meanwhile, in Italy and Greece, more than half of the respondents
surveyed by Pew feel that greater diversity makes their country a worse place to live (53
percent and 63 percent respectively). Furthermore, in line with the aforementioned
findings of Lucassen and Lubbers (2012), Pew found that the ideological right, including
in the US (though not to the extent reported in Europe), is least likely to think greater
diversity makes their country a better place. Moreover, while this survey might suggest
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that Americans are particularly amenable to immigration, the results likely reflect how
American respondents are influenced by the wording of that particular survey question.
According to another survey by Pew, which asks US respondents about whether
immigrants strengthen the US or represent

a

burden, 3 3 percent of those surveyed think

immigrants represent a burden because they take "jobs, housing, and health care" away
from citizens (Jones 2016, n.p.).
Thus, although there is marked variation in attitudes toward immigrants across the
West, it is clear that state leaders in Europe and in the US, and likely in other developed
countries as well, must contend with constituents who bear negative attitudes toward
immigration, thus compelling governments to erect legal and physical barriers to stem the
inflow of immigrants. However, because many strategies aimed at reducing immigration
often fail to address the distributional inequalities that drive people to leave their home
countries for opportunities abroad, many attempts to limit migrant inflows have mixed
levels of success (Bermeo and Leblang 2015).
One of the strategies state leaders may consider, according to work by Bermeo
and Leblang (2015), is to increase bilateral foreign aid to migrant sending countries.
Some policymakers, working under the assumption that foreign aid can promote
economic development in recipients, may view increasing the amount of foreign aid sent
to a migrant sending country as a viable means for reducing immigration. Yet, whether
this strategy actually is effective is unknown; however, as the following sampling of the
literature will show, little evidence supports the idea that aid would have a quick or
meaningful enough positive impact on economic development and the quality of life in a
recipient to sufficiently reduce the demand for immigration.

9

Even so, this does not mean that aid has no impact. To the contrary, it is
plausible, for example, that aid could promote higher rates of immigration by functioning
as a signal to residents in a recipient ofa donor's greater wealth; although, discussion
about this possibility is lacking in the literature.

2.1. The General Effects of Foreign Aid
Though little research on the relationship between foreign aid and migrant flows exists,
there is a long line of scholarship dealing with the effects of foreign aid on recipient
countries, both in terms of its impact (both ideological and material), and in terms of
whether aid accomplishes the goals of donors.
For example, in 1962, Morgenthau, certainly not the first to examine the value of
foreign aid as a policy tool, wrestled with the question ofwhether foreign aid is either "an
instrument offoreign policy," or ifit is transcendent offoreign policy. The latter-view,
according to Morgenthau, holds that foreign aid fulfills an obligation rich countries have
for poor ones, while the former view holds that foreign aid is a wasteful investment (a
"gigantic boon-doggle" asMorgenthau puts it) that does nothing to serve the interests of
both foreign aid donors and their recipients.
More than a decade and a half later Bomschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson
(1978) conducted a meta-analysis of cross-national empirical studies having to do with
the effects offoreign aid/investment in aid-receiving countries. Five general conclusions
were made by the authors: first, foreign aid and investment were found to result in an
increase in economic inequality within aid-receiving countries; second, in the short-term,
aid seemed to promote an increase in a country's relative economic growth; third, in the
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long-:term, aid appeared to have a negative effect on a country's relative economic
growth; fourth, while foreign aid was associated with a decrease in the long-term
economic growth of a country, the degree to which aid exerted a negative effect
depended on a country's level ofdevelopment-aid's negative effect was greater in
richer countries-; fifth, the effects of foreign aid were independent of geography.
More recently, contrary to the above findings, Juselius, Moller, and Tarp (2014)
found that between the 1960s and 2007 foreign aid appeared to have a positive long-term
effect on the macroeconomies of 36 sub-Saharan African countries. However, work by
Asongu (2015) showed that foreign aid was associated with an increase in corruption
(measured via both the corruption perception index and the corruption-control index) in
middle-income, French civil-law, majority Christian, and non-oil exporting landlocked
countries in Africa. Moreover, outside of Africa, further research has shown that foreign
aid limits the positive pressure exerted by import receiving countries on labor rights in
developing, export sending countries (Lim, Mosley, and Prakash 2015). Even so, more
generally foreign aid has been shown to have a positive impact on the quality of a
recipient country's political institutions (Jones and Tarp 2016); albeit, a slight positive
impact that is most associated with governance aid.
Regarding how a recipient makes decisions about allocating aid money once
received, Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998) examined the influence of foreign aid on
recipient countries' public expenditures. They found that from 1971 to 1990 foreign aid
was mostly fungible: when countries received aid for a given project, they often reduced
the amount of their own recourses going to said project and reallocated them to
something else. According to Swaroop and Devarajan (1998), if aid money is fungible,
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and ifa recipient's own public spending is subpar, this increases the likelihood that aid
falls far short of being a cost-effective investment for donors.
As for the effects of aid on regime type and economic liberalization-both factors
that may influence the opportunity cost of migration-Knack (2004), seeking an answer
to the question of whether aid promotes democratic transition in non-democratic
recipients, found that aid had no such promotive effect. And in their study of the
relationship between aid and trade liberalization, Kono and Montinola (20 15) found that
the effect of aid on reducing trade barriers was related to the chances an authoritarian
leader had of holding onto power: the less certain an authoritarian leader was about his
ability to maintain political power, the more likely said leader was to reduce tariffs when
given foreign aid.
Regarding cases ofcoup d'etat, the effectiveness ofreducing foreign aid as
sanctioning a tool against a coup is, according to Masaki (20 16), contingent on all.donor
countries complying with the international norm of political conditionality. While many
countries, suggests Masaki (20 16), issue aid conditionally, the US only sporadically
complies with this norm. This finding has important policy implications because
countries' attempts to apply sanctions on coups are likely to be undermined if large and
influential donors such as the US fail to cooperate. Furthermore, going beyond instances
ofcoup d'etat, this finding may suggest that the failure ofdonor countries to cooperate
generally can have a potentially negative impact on a donor's chances of accomplishing
its goals (for example, promoting development and thereby reducing immigration).
Outside the material implications of foreign aid, aid money may also have an
impact on a recipient's ideology. Swindle (2015), after examining the effect oftargeted
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aid projects in Malawi on changes in gender dynamics, found that foreign aid had an
impact on Malawian views on gender, which may suggest, in tum, that there are
"ideational consequences" offoreign aid allocation, intended or otherwise. However,
regarding more narrowly the impact of aid on views on gender, there are real material
consequences, not just ideological ones, associated with, for example, giving women
more open access to education and human capital and more opportunities to play a
stronger economic and entrepreneurial role in society (Jutting andMorrisson 2005).
Economic development and women's empowerment are strongly correlated, and while it
is doubtful that women's rights and economic development mutually reinforce each other
perfectly, empowering women can have some positive effects on the choices a society
makes, which can have, at best, a moderately positive economic impact (Duflo 20 12).
However, to expect a positive effect to be immediate or substantial, especially as a result
of foreign aid, is more than likely wishful thinking.

2.2. The General Determinants ofAid Allocation
There is disagreement about whether foreign aid allocations are motivated by donor
policy interests or genuine altruism; however, according to Swiss (2016) neither view can
sufficiently account for foreign aid's role in a globalized world. Nevertheless, there is
ample evidence that foreign aid often is allocated by donors for a variety of self
interested reasons.
Research by Alesina and Dollar (2000) has shown that aid allocations are
determined by various political and strategic concerns, in addition to the needs and
policies of recipients. Factors, such as whether the recipient has a colonial past with the
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donor and is a member of an alliance, along with whether a recipient country is a
democracy, has "good" economic policies, and offers protections for property rights,
affect a donor's determination of whether or not to send aid. Furthermore, Wiseman and
Young (20 15) found that when countries allocate foreign aid, they often do so out of self
interest. They discovered that citizens of donor countries receive a "warm-glow" from
their "own"/"own country" donations, and thus, in an effort to compete with the
donations from larger countries such as the US, small countries contribute more aid per
capita.
At the same time, however, the desire to "feel good" about oneself or one's
country for aid allocated to another country can often be tempered by economic crisis in a
donor. According to Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryant (20 16), public support for foreign
aid tends to decline in response to a decline in the wellbeing of a donor country's
economy. Add to this the fact that the rate of retum on foreign aid expected by donors is
similar to the range often considered acceptable to public investors (Arndt, Jones, and
Tarp 20 15) and it becomes clear that pure altruism is rarely a key determining factor in a
donor's decision to allocate aid--donors usually want something in return from aid
recipients.

2.3. Determinants of Immigration
Various theories have been proposed to explain patterns of international migration.
Several in particular, such as neoclassical economics, the new economics of migration,
and dual labor market theory, as well as world systems theory, emphasize the individual,
the household, and the overall global market as their primary level of analysis,
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respectively (Massey et al. 1993). These theories generally focus on income
maximization for the individual, decisions made at the household level to reduce risks
and escape economic constraints, and global economic forces that either establish
"structural requirements" on immigration or lead to "market penetration across national
boundaries" (Massey et al. 1993). Taken together, the general gist ofthese theories is
that migrant flows are fueled by desires for improved income and household security, and
by macroeconomic factors that push individuals out of one country's labor market and
pull them into another's.
If these factors are really the key determinants of migration, then the only truly
effective way to regulate migrant flows would be to balance economic opportunities
within and across borders (Taylor 2007). However, variables other than distributional
inequality also determine migrant patterns. Most obviously, the distance between the
migrant-sending country and the destination country factors into an individual's
determination of the costs involved in migrating (Hatton and Williamson 2003a; Hatton
and Williamson 2003b). Also, the political environment of the destination country-the
relative restrictiveness of citizenship laws, the presence of competitive xenophobic
political parties, etc.-may influence the decision to migrate (Fitzgerald, Leblang, and
Teets 20 14). More restrictive immigration policies, for example, may make it more
difficult for migrants to enter a country legally, while a hostile citizenry in the destination
country may dissuade would-be immigrants from entering.
Social networks among friends and family members may further impact migration
by providing information or financial support for immigrants (Massey et al. 1993). Such
networks offer help to migrants looking for work and housing, and they make integration
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into the host country's society substantially easier (Joly 1987; Sassen 1995; Light,
Bernard, and Kim 1999; Massey et al. 1999).

2.4. The Effects of, and Backlash Associated with, Immigration
Though some evidence suggests that immigration may have at best a positive net effect
on the immigrant receiving country's economy, there remain concerns within
industrialized countries about immigration's potentially negative consequences for low 
skill native workers (Bermeo and Leblang 20 15). Yet, even though some studies have
found a significant and negative correlation between migrant inflows and wages for
native workers (especially those who lack a high school degree), recent research by
Ottaviano and Peri (20 12) provides evidence that migrant inflows into the US have had a
small, though positive, effect on wages for native workers without a high school degree,
as well as a positive effect on overall native wages, while migrant inflows have had a
negative effect on the wages of previous immigrants.
However, despite the lack of strong evidence that immigration has a pronounced
negative impact on a destination country's economy, a lack of support for freer
immigration policies tends to be prevalent among those most exposed to immigrant fiscal
pressures: native taxpayers who perceive immigrants as a costly burden (Hanson,
Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). Furthermore, as previously discussed, negative attitudes
toward immigration remain salient in many European countries and (to a lesser extent) in
the US, and there recently has been a rise in the popularity and competitiveness of radical
rightwing parties in response to the arrival of foreign workers (Lucassen and Lubbers
20 12), putting greater pressure on politicians to implement tougher restrictions on
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immigration (Bermeo and Leblang 20 15).

2.5. Foreign Aid as a Strategy for Curbing Immigration
Although restrictive immigration policies can reduce the flow of immigrant workers,
because such barriers fail to balance the cross-border inequalities that motivate
immigration, they fall far short of halting the flow of migrant labor altogether (Bermeo
and Leblang 20 15).
As already mentioned, some policymakers presume foreign aid can serve as an
additional tool for reducing migrant inflows by promoting economic development in
migrant-sending countries, thereby reducing the demand to immigrate to the donor.
However, as the literature on the effects of foreign aid suggests, there is inconclusive
evidence that that foreign aid is an effective development tool, at least in the short-term.
Nevertheless, there is some anecdotal evidence that policymakers use aid strategically to
curb immigration (Bermeo and Leblang 20 15). For instance, in 2008 the French foreign
aid agency partnered with the French Ministry oflmmigration, Integration, National
Identity, and Inclusive Development to implement a strategy to give "support 'for the
development ofmigrants' home countries or regions to ensure that migration does not
become the only way for local populations to survive or live decently"' (qtd. in Bermeo
and Leblang 20 15, 63 1). Furthermore, Bermeo and Leblang (20 15) provide compelling
empirical evidence that bilateral aid commitments are positively tied to changes in the
size of migrant populations from recipient countries residing in a donor, suggesting that
policymakers do indeed increase foreign aid in response to an increase in immigration as
a part of a strategy to reduce migrant inflows.
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Several scholars, however, are skeptical that aid is likely an effective means for
reducing the demand to immigrate. Faini and Venturini ( 1993) speculate that the
relationship between income and immigration may take the form of an inverted U-curve.
They suggest that improvements in income may lead to an increase in migration among
low wage foreign workers and to a decrease in migration among higher wage earning
foreign workers. Meanwhile, others, such as de Haas (2007), think that aid is highly
unlikely to decrease migrant inflows altogether, and Bermeo and Leblang (20 15) suggest
that, at the very least, aid is unlikely to have an effect in the short-term. However,
contrary to the skeptics, Hatzipanayotou andMichael (2012) hypothesize that increases in
foreign aid sent to a recipient ought to reduce the demand for immigration, provided the
recipient increases its co-financing rate; yet, their model remains theoretical at this point.
So, while there is no want for speculation on whether aid has an impact on immigration,
there is a surprising lack of systematic empirical analysis that can allow one to conclude
whether aid is or is not an effective tool for reducing immigration. Even more, the
question of whether aid might potentially lead to an increase in immigration remains, to
this author's knowledge, completely unaddressed.
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

From the foregoing discussion, a few main points can be surmised. First, while it is
possible that donors send foreign aid to recipient countries for altruistic reasons, there is
ample evidence that aid is given for a number of self-interested reasons as well. Also, it
may be that a desire to reduce immigration is one among many of these self-interested
reasons for sending foreign aid. State leaders may assume that aid can help to promote
economic development in recipients and that the (supposed) improvement in the
recipient's economy, in turn , may increase the opportunity cost associated with
migrating.
Second, there are a number of factors associated with migrant flows, but one of
the most important is the balance (or imbalance) of resources within and across borders.
Greater economic wealth, more opportunities for employment, the promise of better
standards of living, and greater security in one country relative to another motivate
migration.
It is unclear, however, whether or how foreign aid might affect the balance of
resources between donor and recipient, or the perception thereof, and thus influence a
given individual's decision to migrate. While there is little evidence that aid really does
promote economic development in recipients-at least in a timely enough fashion to
reduce migrant inflows in a meaningful way-none have systematically examined
whether, how, or in what direction aid influences immigration.

3.1. Does Foreign Aid Influence the (Perceived) Balance of Resources across Borders?
While the absolute and relative balance of resources between any two countries certainly
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influences the decision to migrate, this balance would have no meaningful impact if it
was not perceived. But, since no individual can see directly what the balance of
resources is between this and that country, an individual must rely on certain signals to
inform her of the balance of resources between her home country and her potential
destination. The question here is, does foreign aid function as one such signal of wealth?
And, if so, does an increase in foreign aid sent to a recipient make a donor appear like a
more appealing destination, even when controlling for the actual wealth of the donor?
Provided residents of an aid recipient are aware that aid is being allocated to their country
from a donor, it seems plausible that this aid could give residents in a recipient the
impression that a donor has greater wealth.
Of course, assuming it is true that foreign aid influences the perceived balance of
resources between donor and recipient, there is still the further question of how
individuals in a recipient might be made aware of changes in foreign aid sent to their
country from a donor. Gaging perception on a large scale is obviously problematic, but
there are a few likely mechanisms by which perception might be facilitated. Information
made available by state leaders and national news outlets is one likely source, while
another possible avenue through which such information could be obtained is migrant
social networks. As discussed in the literature review, migrants already residing in a
donor can provide relatives living back in their home country with more than just
financial resources, help looking for employment and housing in the destination country,
and assistance in making the transition to life in a new society, but also information about
the wealth of a donor and the prospects for a better life there

CJ oly 1987; Massey et al.

1993; Sassen 1995; Light, Bernard, and Kim 1999; Massey et al. 1999). It is,
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therefore, hardly

a

stretch to suppose that such transnational migrant social networks also

could provide information about the amount of aid sent from a donor to a recipient-in
fact, there is even evidence that migrants lobby host states to send more aid to their
. respective countries of origin (Bermeo and Leblang 2015).

3.2. Aid and Immigration: A Positive Relationship?
Assuming aid is one among many potential signals to residents in a recipient of the
relative wealth and appeal of a donor, evidence of a positive relationship between aid and
immigration ought to exist. Thus, the results of an analysis of the effect of aid from
donor countries to recipients on migrant inflows from recipients to donors should support
the following hypothesis:

H1:

An increase in aid sent from a donor to a recipient should result in an
increase in migration from the recipient to the donor, ceteris paribus.

Also, because the ability of aid to influence the decision to migrate may depend
on the ability of residents in aid recipients to be made aware of a donor's decision to
increase or decrease aid, the interaction of aid with factors such as whether a donor and
recipient share a common language, whether they share a colonial past, and whether the
recipient is a democracy may have a significant impact on migration. While these factors
may not perfectly measure whether recipients have a greater perception of foreign aid
being allocated to their country, the possibility that such factors may promote greater
awareness is at the very least conceivable. A common language between donor and
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recipient, for example, may make it easier for residents in recipient countries to be made
aware of changes in aid sent from a donor, and a shared colonial past may indicate the
presence of historical ties between donor and recipient. Meanwhile, democratic
recipients may have more open access to information from relatives and other social
connections abroad, as well as to transparent news and other media in their own country
and from donor countries, promoting greater awareness of aid allocated to their country
from a donor. Thus, I further test the following hypotheses:

H2 :

The interaction of aid with whether a donor and recipient share a
common language should have a positive effect on migrant inflows, ceteris
paribus.

H3 :

The interaction of aid with whether a donor and recipient share a
colonial past should have a positive effect on migrant inflows, ceteris
paribus.

H4 :

The interaction of aid with whether a recipient is a democracy should
have a positive effect on migrant inflows, ceteris paribus.

3.3. How Strong is the Pull of Bilateral Foreign Aid?
Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets (2014), in their analysis of the effects of political
conditions in migrant-receiving countries on bilateral migrant inflows, found that greater
levels of pro-immigration rights in migrant receivers had a positive impact on migrant
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inflows and that this positive effect was able to overcome "gravity": that is, the effects of
traditional material concerns such as economic interest and bilateral distance that factor
into the opportunity cost ofmigration were "defied" by the pull of friendlier political
rights in migrant-receiving countries.
Provided evidence that foreign aid has a positive effect on bilateral migrant
inflows is found, it further would be useful to assess just how powerful its effect is.
Other researchers have described their models ofbilateral migrant flows as "gravity
type" equations that, in essence, measure the push-pull forces that influence immigration
(Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets 2014; Mayda 2010; Ortega and Peri 2009; Gogger and
Hansen 2008; Clark, Hatton, and Williamson 2007). One way to estimate the strength of
aid's bilateral "gravitational pull" on migrant inflows is to estimate a model where
bilateral aid is interacted with bilateral distance and one where it is interacted with donor
migration policy restrictiveness. Once estimated, the marginal effects of aid can be
calculated for each model and plotted against bilateral distance and migration policy
restrictiveness, allowing inference ofthe relative strength of foreign aid's bilateral
gravitational pull. So, contingent on whether the following analysis rejects the null for
the first hypothesis, I ask the following research questions :

Rt:

If the effect of aid on migrant inflows is positive and statistically
significant, how strong is aid 's pull on migrant inflows relative to the
bilateral distance?
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Ri:

If the effect of aid on migrant inflows is positive and statistically
significant, how strong is aid 's pull on migrant inflows relative to the
restrictiveness of a donor 's immigration policy?
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4. DATA AND METHODS

4.1. The Model
To model the effect of bilateral foreign aid on migrant inflows, I develop the following
model of donor-recipient relations, and, following Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets (20 14),
I utilize ordinary least squares (OLS):

log(rlnflowct,t)
+

+

=

a +

p4log(drDistancect)

+

Pslog(dGDPcapct,1-1)
+

P ilog(dAidct,t-1)

+

P2dRestric!ct,t-1

+

p3rConflictct,t-1

PsdrColonyct + P6drLanguagect + P1rDemocracyct,t-1
+

p9dUnemploymentct,t-1 + P 10log(dPopulationct,1-1)

P 1 1log(rlnflowct,1-1)

+

dFEct + ryFEct + Ect,t.

I additionally estimate models where log(dAidd,1-1) is interacted with drColonyd,

drLanguaged, and rDemocracyd,1-1 to further test hypotheses 2 through 4, and I also
estimate models where log(dAidd,1-1) is interacted with log(drDistanced) and dRestrictd,1-1
to offer answers to research questions 1 and 2. Also, because the dependent variable
displays left censoring at 0 (migrant inflows are a non-negative continuous variable),
utilizing OLS may yield biased estimates. Thus, as a check against bias I also utilize
Tobit estimation, where it is assumed there is a latent dependent variable (y *) where y*
the observed value of y if y *

>

=

0, but not otherwise (see Tobin 1958 and Amemiya 1973).

4.2. Unit ofAnalysis
The unit of analysis is dyad-years, where each dyad (d) captures the relationship between
of one of 18 donor countries, all of which are members of the Organization for Economic
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Co-operation and Development (OECD), and one of 130 aid recipients. Donor-recipient
relations are analyzed from 1994 to 20 1 1 (t). The donors included in the analysis are
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. For each of these countries, variables for dyadic migrant inflows and
foreign aid commitments vary substantially across time and across cases. Due to
inconsistencies in donor reporting, in some instances the available data are incomplete.

4.3. Operationalization of the Dependent Variable: Migrant Inflows
The dependent variable, migrant inflows (log(rlnjlowd,J), is operationalized as the natural
log of (one plus) bilateral migrant inflows in thousands from aid recipients to donors.
Data on migrant inflows is drawn from the InternationalMigration Database found at
OECD.stat, a data site run by the OECD. Migration flows are measured by the OECD
using population registers, residence and/or work permits, and specific surveys.

4.4. Operationalization of the Independent Variable ofInterest: Aid Commitments
Foreign aid (log(dAidd,t-1)) is operationalized as the natural log of (plus one) bilateral aid
commitments in millions of constant (20 14) dollars from donors to recipients. Aid
commitments are lagged by 1 year in order to account for endogeneity. Data for aid
commitments is drawn from OECD data (dataset DAC3a), which can be found at
OECD.stat. According to the OECD,

A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official
agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds,
to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms
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and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient
country or a multilateral agency (20 16, n.p.).

4.5. Operationalization of Control Variables
The factors that motivate migration are many and complex, several of which have been
identified in the migration literature as having significant influence on migrant flows. To
control for their effect, a number of these factors are included in the analysis, and, to
account for endogeneity, each is lagged by one year.

4. 5. 1. Restrictiveness of a Donor 's Migration Policy. When countries pass more
restrictive immigration policies, they often do so in an effort to curb immigration. Such
efforts, while also being potentially effective, may also signal hostility toward new
migrants. Thus, more restrictive immigration policies (dRestrictd,t-1) should be associated
with a decline in migrant inflows. To capture the restrictiveness ofa country's migration
policy, I use the International Migration Institute's DEMIG Policy dataset, which
assesses for every piece of immigration-related legislation passed in each donor country
over the period included in this analysis whether the legislation is intended to reduce
restrictions on immigration, result in no change in restrictions on immigration, or increase
restrictions on immigration. I measure the net change in restrictiveness of a donor's
migration policy per year as 1 if in a given year the sum of the number of restrictive
migration policies (individually scored as 1) plus the number of unrestrictive policies
(individually scored as - 1) plus the number of policies that have no effect on migration
policy restriction (individually scored as 0) is greater than 0. The net restrictiveness for a
given year is measured as -1 if the sum of the number of unrestrictive policies (- 1) plus
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the number of restrictive policies ( 1) plus the number of restriction-neutral policies (0) is
less than 0. Finally, I measure the net change in the migration policy of a country for a
given year as 0 if the sum of the number of restrictive policies ( 1) plus the number of
unrestrictive policies (- 1) plus the number of restriction-neutral policies (0) equals 0. The
relative migration policy restrictiveness per year is then estimated relative to the previous
year beginning with 1993 and adjusted so that the lowest restrictive migration policy
score per donor equals 0. For example, if a donor's level ofmigration policy
restrictiveness is estimated, based on the methodology outlined above, as 1 in 1993, 0 in
1994, 1 in 1995, and 1 in 1996, these scores would then be recoded as 1, 1, 2, and 3
respectively so that the scores are relative to the baseline set in 1993. Then these scores
would be adjusted downward by - 1 since the lowest estimated score was 1 so that the
final estimated scores are 0, 0, 1, and 2.

4. 5.2.

Severity of Civil Conflict in the Aid Recipient. Using the "Major Episodes of

Political Violence, 1946-20 14" dataset compiled by the Center for Systemic Peace, I take
the total summed magnitude of all societal episodes of political violence (which includes
the severity of incidents of civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and ethnic war) in
each aid recipient per year (rConflictd,1-1). The severity of civil conflict is measured on a
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 equals no civil conflict and 10 equals the most severe level of
civil conflict.

4. 5.3.

Distance between Donor and Recipient. The distance between donor and recipient

(log(drDistancea)) is measured as the natural log of the bilateral distance in kilometers
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between both countries' largest cities where the intercity distance is estimated using a
gravity equation that weights the intercity distance based on the proportion of each
country's population living in each city ( for more details seeMayor and Zignago 2011).
Data is drawn from the dist_cepii dataset, found under the GeoDist page at CEPII's
website.

4. 5. 4.

Colonial Ties. To control for the possibility that a donor and a recipient have ever

had a pervious colonial tie, I use a dummy variable (drColonyd) that equals 1 if a donor
and recipient share a colonial past and 0 if otherwise. Data is drawn from the dist_cepii
dataset.

4. 5. 5.

Common Language between Donor and Recipient. Because language can often be

a barrier to integration in a new country, if a donor and recipient share a common
language, this ought to reduce the opportunity cost of migrating to a donor. So, using
data drawn from the dist_cepii dataset, I use a dummy variable (drLanguaged) that equals
1 if a donor and recipient share a common language and 0 if otherwise.

4. 5. 6.

Regime of the Aid Recipient. If the aid recipient has a polity 2 score of 6 or greater

according to the "Polity IV Annual Time Series, 1800-2014" compiled by Polity IV, I
code 1, indicating that the country is a democracy, and 0 if otherwise for a dummy
variable (rDemocracyd,t-I)

4. 5. 7.

Wealth of the Donor. The wealthier the donor country, the more appealing it looks
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to residents in aid recipient countries. Thus, to control for the wealth of a donor I use the
natural log of the real gross domestic product per capita in constant (2005) US dollars per
donor (log(dGDPcapd,t-1)). Data for gross domestic product for each donor from 1993 to
2011 is drawn from the Penn World Table, version 8.1.

4. 5. 8. Employment Opportunities in the Donor. Because the unemployment rate in a
donor country may indicate to would-be migrants what the likelihood is of not being able
to find work in a donor (Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets 2014), I control for the effect of
the unemployment rate in a donor country (dUnemploymentd,t-1) using the modeled ILO
(International Labor Organization) estimate ofa donor's unemployment rate (i.e., the
proportion of the labor force without employment but is currently able to work or looking
for employment) made available by the World Bank at World DataBank.

4. 5. 9. Population of the Donor. Previous research has shown that countries with larger
populations experience lower inflows of migrants (Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets 2014).
Thus, to control for a donor's population I take the natural log ofthe population (in
millions) for each donor for each year included in the analysis (log(dPopulationd,t-1)).
Data is drawn from the Penn World Table, version 8.1.

4. 5. 1 0. Inflow ofMigrants the Previous Year. It is highly likely that migrant inflows the
previous year are correlated with inflows the following year. To control for this, as well
as to offer a check against autocorrelation, I take the natural log of (one plus) the bilateral
inflow of migrants in thousands per dyad and lag it by one year (log(rlnflow)d, t-1).
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4. 5. 1 1 . Donor and Recipient*Year Fixed Effects. Following the methodology of
Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets (2014), I control for the fixed effects of "time-invariant
features" ofdonor countries that may influence migrant flows (dFEJ) and time-varying
fixed effects associated with aid recipients (ryFEJ) that generate "emigration pressures"
on residents living in a recipient. The first set of fixed effects is a matrix of donor
dummy variables, and the second is a matrix of recipient *year dummy variables.
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5. RESULTS
5.1.

Results from Main Model

After dropping cases with missing values, the model proposed in the previous section was
estimated for a total of 19,08 1 dyad-years. A list of donors and recipients, along with
summary statistics, can be found in the appendix.
The model performed remarkably well, with a statistically significant F and an
adjusted R2 of 0.93. The results support the hypothesis that bilateral aid commitments
have a significant positive impact on migrant inflows, ceteris paribus. Additionally, the
results show that a shared colonial past and a common language, previous migrant
inflows, greater GDP per capita in a donor, more severe civil conflict in a recipient, and,

TABLE 1 .
OLS MODEL RESULTS
Bilateral Characteristics

Aid Commitments
Distance
Colonial Past
Common Language
Previous Migrant Inflows

Model Estimates

0.05 (0.0 1 ) *
-0 . 2 1 (0 .02)*
0 .24 (0.04)*
0 . 1 6 (0.02) *
0.82 (0.0 1 ) *

Donor Characteristics

Migration Policy Restrictiveness
GDP/capita
Unemployment Rate
Population

-0. 0 1 (0.003) *
1 . 1 4 (0.22)*
0 . 0 1 (0.003) *
- 1 .62 (0 .34)*

Recipient Characteristics

Severity of Civil Conflict
Democracy

0 . 1 1 (0.03)*
0 . 1 (0. 1 6)

Model Summary

1 9,08 1
Dyad-Years
2
0.93
Adjusted R
Notes: Cell entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors
are clustered by dyad using the method outlined by Stock and
Watson (2008) and shown (in parentheses) . Intercept and fixed
effects not shown.
*

<

0 .05 .
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unexpectedly, an increase in the unemployment rate in a donor had a significant and
positive association with migrant inflows . Meanwhile, as expected, greater bilateral
distance, more restrictive immigration policies, and a larger donor population had a
significant and negative impact on migrant inflows . The effect ofa democratic regime in
a recipient was positive though it failed to reach statistical significance .

5.2. A ccounting for Left Censoring
As Figure 1 shows, the dependent variable's (migrant inflows) distribution displays left
censoring at 0 per several donors, which may bias estimates ofthe slope and intercept
when using OLS . The plotted residuals, fitted values, and actual values in Figure 2 offer
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OLS MODEL PERFORMANCE

further confirmation of left censoring. In order to account for this, I utilize Tobit
estimation; however, due to subscripting errors, a Tobit model that includes recipient
time-variant fixed effects could not be computed. To work around this computational
error, I replaced this set of fixed effects with a set of time-invariant recipient fixed effects
and year fixed effects .
In line with the results from OLS, Tobit regression also yields support for the
hypothesis that aid commitments have a positive impact on migrant inflows . The only
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TABLE 2 .
TOBIT MODEL RESU LTS
Bilateral Characteristics

Aid Commitments
Distance
Colonial Past
Common Language
Previous Migrant Inflows

Model Estimates

0.04 (0.0 1 ) *
-0 .22 (0.02) *
0.23 (0.03)*
0 . 1 8 (0.02) *
0 . 8 3 (0.004)*

Donor C haracteristics

Migration Policy Restrictiveness
GDP/capita
Unemployment Rate
Population

-0. 0 1 (0.004) *
0 . 9 (0.28)*
0.0 1 (0.004) *
- 1 . 8 1 (0 .32)*

Recipient Characteristics

Severity of Civil Conflict
Democracy

0.01 (0.006) *
-0 .05 (0.02)*

Model Summary

1 9,08 1
Dyad-Years
-20,507 . 8 5
Log-Likelihood
Notes: Cell entries are Tobit coefficients. Classic standard errors
are (in parentheses). Intercepts and fixed effects not shown. Due
to subscripting errors, estimation with time-variant fixed effects
of recipients could not be computed, so this set of fixed effects
was replaced with a set of time-invariant fixed effects per
recipient and a set of year fixed effects. See Figure A in the
Appendix
*p

<

0.05 .

major difference between the OLS and Tobit estimates is that the direction ofthe effect
ofa recipient's regime flipped and is now statistically significant: a recipient being a
democracy has a significant, negative impact on migrant inflows.
Figure 3 displays a more intuitive graphical representation ofthe estimated
coefficients. Comparison ofthe coefficient plots for the OLS and Tobit models shows
some similarities as well as a number ofdifferences. Each point represents the estimated
coefficient per covariate, and the bars on either side represent the standard errors. Ifthe
standard error crosses the 0 axis, the result fails to reach statistical significance.
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5.3. Testing Hypotheses 2 through 4

Further analysis fails to find robust support for the hypotheses that the interaction of
bilateral aid commitments with a shared colonial past, a common language, and
democratic regime in a recipient have a positive impact on migrant inflows. As the
results displayed in Table 3 show, none of the interaction effects have a statistically
significant impact.
The results for three Tobit models also fail to offer support for these three
hypotheses. In each of the models, the interaction term fails to reject the null. Again,
unlike in the OLS models, the effect of a democratic regime in a recipient is negative and
statistically significant. Also, as with the previous Tobit model, time-variant recipient
36

fixed effects could not be computed due to subscripting errors, so recipient time-invariant
fixed effects and year fixed effects were included in model estimation instead.
A comparison of the Tobit and OLS estimates can be seen in Figure 4 . Again, the
results display a number of similarities, but also a number of differences. In each,
however, it is clear that the interaction effects fall far short of statistical significance.

TABLE 3 .

OLS MODEL RESULTS
Interaction Effects

Aid Commitments*Colonial Past
Aid Commitments*Common Language
Aid Commitments*Democracy

-0.03 (0 .02)
0 .002 (0.0 1 )
0 .003 (0.0 1 )

Model Summary

Dyad-Years
Adjusted R 2

1 9,08 1

1 9,08 1

1 9,08 1

0.93

0.93

0.93

Notes: Cell entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are clustered by dyad (see
Stock and Watson 2008) and shown (in parentheses) . Only interaction effects shown.
*p < 0.05 .

TABLE 4 .
TOBIT MODEL RESULTS
Interaction Effects

Aid Commitments*Colonial Past
Aid Commitments*Common Language
Aid Commitments*Democracy

-0 .03 (0.02)
-0 .00 1 (0 .0 1 )
0.002 (0.0 1 )

Model Summary

Dyad-Years
Log-Likelihood

1 9,08 1

1 9,08 1

1 9,08 1

-20,506.69

-20,507 . 84

-20,507 . 8 1

Notes: Cell entries are Tobit coefficients. Classic standard errors are (in parentheses) .
Intercepts and fixed effects not shown. Due to subscripting errors, estimation with time-variant
fixed effects of recipients could not be computed, so this set of fixed effects was replaced with
a set of time-invariant fixed effects per recipient and a set of year fixed effects. Only
interaction effects shown.
*p < 0.05 .
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5.4. Can the Pull ofAid Commitments "Defy Gravity?"

As outlined in the data and methods section, to answer research questions 1 and 2, I
interact bilateral aid commitments with bilateral distance and with the restrictiveness of
donor migration policy to assess whether the effect ofa one unit increase in aid,
contingent on an increase in bilateral distance and contingent on an increase in donor
migration policy restrictiveness, is positive and statistically significant
The results, however, show that despite the positive impact ofaid on migrant
inflows, the interaction ofaid with bilateral distance and with donor migration policy
restrictiveness fail to reject the null hypothesis (Table 5 and Figure 5). The marginal
effect of bilateral distance and ofmigration policy restrictiveness are plotted in Figure 6 .
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TABLE 5 .
OLS AND TOBIT MODEL RESULTS
OLS Estimates

Interaction Effects

Aid Commitments*Distance

Tobit Estimates
0 . 002
(0 .0 1 )

-0. 002
(0.005)

0.00 1
(0.002)

-0.00 1
(0.00 1 )

Aid Commitments *Migration Policy
Restrictiveness
Model Summary

Dyad-Years
Adjusted R2

1 9,08 1

1 9,08 1

0 . 93

0.93

1 9,08 1

1 9,08 1

-20,507.79
-20,507.72
Log-Likelihood
Notes : Cell entries are OLS and Tobit coefficients. Robust standard errors are clustered by
dyad (See Stock and Watson 2008) and shown (in parentheses) for OLS estimates. C lassic
standard errors are shown (in parentheses) for Tobit estimates. Only interaction effects shown.
Due to subscripting errors, Tobit estimation with time-variant fixed effects of recipients could
not be computed, so this set of fixed effects was replaced with a set of time-invariant fixed
effects per recipient and a set of year fixed effects.
*p < 0 . 0 5 .
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These results suggest, to borrow from Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets (20 1 4, 425),
that bilateral foreign aid does not play a powerful "role in compensating for the
transaction costs associated with migrating." Put differently, while an increase in
bilateral foreign aid may lead to more bilateral migrant inflows, ceteris paribus, bilateral
distance and more restrictive immigration policies remain important deterrents of
migration even as bilateral foreign aid increases. In fact, as bilateral aid increases, in a
striking twist, the effects of greater bilateral distance and of more restrictive donor
migration policies become even more negative; although, it should be noted that the 95%
confidence intervals display a great deal of variance.
However, while the interactions of foreign aid with bilateral distance and with
donor migration policy restrictiveness are not statistically significant, as the plotted
marginal effect of bilateral aid in Figure 7 shows, the positive impact of aid seems to
decrease as both bilateral distance and donor migration policy restrictiveness increase. In
other words, the gravitational pull of bilateral aid, through remaining positive, loses some
of its strength with greater bilateral distance and more restrictive donor immigration
policies (the 95% confidence intervals display a high degree of variance, however) .
Taken together with the effect of aid on the marginal effects of bilateral distance
and donor migration policy restrictiveness, these results suggest that while bilateral
foreign aid does significantly affect bilateral push-pull forces, greater bilateral distance
and more restrictive donor immigration policies slightly diminish the effect of bilateral
aid on bilateral migrant inflows, while an increase in bilateral aid seems to be associated
with an increase in the strength of the negative marginal effects of both bilateral distance
and donor immigration policy restrictiveness. The strength of aid' s positive pull, it
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seems, is not enough to reduce the limitations imposed by distance and restrictive
immigration policies. In fact, as aid increases, its positive impact may diminish.
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5.5. Why the Diminishing Positive Impact of Foreign Aid?

5. 5. 1. An Upper Thresholdfor Migrant Inflows. There are multiple ways to interpret this
finding, but perhaps one of the more parsimonious is that yearly bilateral migrant inflows
simply cannot increase ad infinitum. At some point, perhaps at a point unique to each
dyadic relationship between countries, there is an upper threshold for bilateral migrant
inflows that, when approached, leads to a gradual slowing and leveling off (or even
reversal) of the effect of aid on migrant inflows, thereby leading to an increase in bilateral
distance and donor migration policy restrictiveness' s negative marginal effects. Figure 8
shows the smoothed curve with 95% confidence intervals for the plotted relationship
between bilateral aid commitments at year t- 1 and bilateral migrant inflows at year t for
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each donor included in the analysis. While in some instances the relationship appears
fairly linear, in others the relationship either takes the form of an inverted " U " or "J" or it
fluctuates in a way that resembles a sine wave.
However, when the relationship between bilateral aid commitments and migrant
inflows is plotted by year rather than by donor, the results look substantially smoother
(Figure 9). Furthermore, when the relationship is plotted by both donor and year, the
results look cleaner still (Figure 1 0) . Even so, there are yet examples where the
relationship between bilateral aid and migrant inflows is not perfectly linear. It may be
that in these cases, bilateral migrant inflows simply have hit their upper limit. That is, as
bilateral aid increases, its positive effect eventually diminishes as the number of actual
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migrants increases relative to the pool of potential migrants in a recipient, at which point
other "gravitational forces" that have a negative effect on immigration may experience an
increase in their marginal effects.
This explanation, though merely speculative, does have some empirical support
when I assume in my model that bilateral aid has a quadratic relationship with migrant
inflows. Table 6 displays the OLS and Tobit coefficients for such a model. In each, the
coefficient for bilateral aid commitments is positive and statistically significant while the
squared value for bilateral aid commitments is statistically significant and negative,
suggesting that as bilateral aid commitments increase the slope of their effect is at first
positive but eventually curves downward (see Figures 1 1 and 1 2), supporting the above
speculation that the positive effect of bilateral aid on migrant inflows eventually yields
diminishing returns. Further indication that a quadratic relationship may better explain
the relationship between aid and migrant inflows is that the log-likelihood for the Tobit

TABLE 6.
OLS AND TOBIT MODEL RESULTS
Quadratic Effects

Aid Commitments
Aid Commitments"2

OLS Estimates

Tobit Estimates

0.07 (0.0 1 ) *
-0.005 (0.002)*

0.08 (0.0 1 ) *
-0 . 0 1 (0 .002) *

1 9,08 1

1 9,08 1

Model Summary

Dyad-Years
Adjusted R 2

0.93

-20,502 . 1 7
Log-Likelihood
Notes: Cell entries are OLS and Tobit coefficients. Robust standard errors are clustered by
dyad (See Stock and Watson 2008) and shown (in parentheses) for OLS estimates . Classic
standard errors are shown (in parentheses) for Tobit estimates. Only bilateral aid effects
shown. Due to subscripting errors, Tobit estimation with time-variant fixed effects of
recipients could not be computed, so this set of fixed effects was replaced with a set of time
invariant fixed effects per recipient and a set of year fixed effects.
*p < 0.05 .
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model suggests a comparatively better fit, though slight, compared to the Tobit models
estimated previously. The comparative performance of the

OLS

model compared to

those previously estimated, however, is much less substantial .

5. 5. 2. More Aidfor More Efficient Investments.

While the above explanation seems

plausible enough, there are still two other rather parsimonious explanations for why the
effect of foreign aid on bilateral migrant inflows is curvilinear: 1 ) perhaps it takes a great
deal of bilateral aid to effectively and meaningfully improve conditions in a recipient to
sufficiently counter the positive signaling aid would otherwise have on would-be
migrants ' determination of the cost-benefit ratio associated with moving to the donor; or,
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2) maybe donors, desiring a sensible return on investment, are more likely to allocate
greater amounts of aid to recipients who would make better use of that aid, and that aid ' s
better use, which translates into better economic and quality of life outcomes, thereby
reduces the demand to emigrate.
These explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but there is reason to
think the latter view may be the better explanation of the two . The notion that if
countries simply throw enough money at recipients the demand for bilateral migration
will go away seems, at its face, naYve . It seems more likely (and more in line with
previous research) that donors choose to allocate greater amounts of aid when they have
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more confidence that recipients will use that aid more effectively. As briefly discussed in
the literature review, there is evidence that when donors make decisions about allocating
aid they take into consideration features of the recipient country that indicate to the donor
whether aid will yield a good (however defined) return on investment. If certain
countries appear to donors as more "worthy" recipients, donors further may feel safer
allocating more aid to these countries under the assumption that that investment is a safer
bet. In tum, assuming donors have made an accurate appraisal of these more worthy
recipients, these countries may put the foreign aid they receive to better use, leading to
economic improvements, more jobs, better standards of living, etc.
More effective use of bilateral aid on the part of these recipients may additionally
explain why increased bilateral aid is associated with stronger bilateral distance and
donor migration policy restrictiveness marginal effects. When considering the costs and
benefits of staying in their home country versus moving to a given donor, would-be
migrants living in a country where government officials put foreign aid to better use may
place greater weight on the costs associated with moving to a donor, and they conversely
may place less weight on the positive signals of donor wealth created by greater bilateral
aid, because that aid results in more tangible benefits for residents in recipients. In such
countries, an increase in bilateral aid might make staying rather than leaving seem like
the more appealing option.
The flip side of this scenario, of course, is that in cases where an overall lesser
amount of aid is allocated to a recipient that fails to effectively use that aid, an increase in
bilateral foreign aid may lead to an increase in bilateral migrant inflows because, in such
a case, the positive signals of greater donor wealth relative to a recipient may seem to
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outweigh the positive benefits that that aid could yield in a recipient in the minds of
would-be migrants.
Nevertheless, regardless of why aid might have a positive, though curvilinear,
relationship with bilateral immigration, the empirical evidence provided by this analysis
stands; however, future research will need to consider these results in greater detail and
address the plausibility of the explanations offered.
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6. BILATERAL AID AND IMMIGRATION: TAKING A CLOSER LOOK

While large N quantitative analyses can reveal a statistically significant relationship
between two or more variables, individual cases can often defy larger trends. Taking a
narro wer look at the dyadic relationship between donors and recipients can allow for a
more nuanced understanding of the role bilateral aid commitments may play in
motivating international migrant flows that the previous large N analysis may have
missed.
To see how well the results from the models estimated in the preceding section
hold up under the microscope, I examine and compare the dyadic relationships between
two OECD donor countries and three aid recipients of each. The donors I selected are
France and Great Britain. Both donors are former colonial powers, both are
geographically proximate, and both have comparable per capita GDP . For each country,
I

selected three aid recipients based on their geographical proximity to one another and

whether each of the cases had available data for enough years to allow for a meaningful
longitudinal analysis. I also attempted to control for historical bilateral donor-recipient
relationships by selecting cases that were prior colonies of each donor. Using these
criteria I selected the following aid recipients :
•

For France, the North African countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia;

•

For Britain, the South Asian countries of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
For each donor and its three recipients I examine the bilateral impact of foreign

aid at year t-1 on bilateral migrant inflows at year t and observe whether the hypothesis
that greater bilateral aid should be associated with greater bilateral migrant inflows (H 1 )
holds true for the selected cases. In doing so, I try to control fo r other relevant factors
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that may influence immigration, such as per capita GDP in the donor and donor migration
policy restrictiveness.
In order to test H1 for such a small subset of data, I first compare the observed
level of bilateral immigration per dyad (as bilateral aid varies) to the predicted level of
bilateral immigration per dyad (also as bilateral aid varies) to ascertain whether in the
context of Britain and South Asia and France and North Africa the model in the previous
section adequately accounts for variation in immigration that is explained by variance in
the multiple correlates of migrant inflows controlled for in the prior analysis and, whether
when these factors are controlled for, aid ' s positive relationship with immigration
remains. I then develop and estimate a series of models using this smaller set of cases to
determine whether the significance of foreign aid' s positive pull on immigration is
relatively constant between donors. Finally, because it has been shown by the previous
analysis that an increase in the restrictiveness a donor' s immigration laws might dampen
the gravity of aid, I tum my focus to a consideration of Britain and France' s migration
policies and the extent to which these policies may negatively impact immigration despite
an increase in foreign aid. However, whether donor migration policy will have a
significant effect is uncertain given the high degree of variability in its marginal impact
as aid varies and, conversely, the high degree of variability in aid ' s marginal impact as
migration policy restrictiveness varies.

6.1. Summary of British and French Aid and Bilateral Immigration
6. 1. 1. French Aid to and Immigration from North Africa. The selection of three North
African former colonies of France is not arbitrary. Since 1 998, France has made it a
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priority to focus its aid on a select number of countries, including its former African
colonies (Atwill 20 1 1 ) . In accordance with UN Millennium Development Goals, French
foreign aid is prioritized toward projects aimed at reducing poverty, promoting education,
improving water sanitation, healthcare, environmental protection, agriculture,
transportation, and productive sector development (UNECE 20 1 0) . From 1 993 to 201 0 ,
France committed an average of $24 7 million (in 20 1 4 US dollars) per year to Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia, with aid in a given year totaling as much as $ 1 . 1 8 billion (in 20 1 4
US dollars) to as little as $63 . 5 million (in 20 1 4 US dollars) . Over a similar period
( 1 994-20 1 1 ), France experienced a combined average yearly rate of immigration from
these three countries of 1 5 . 7 million, with bilateral immigration ranging from as much as
3 1 . 1 million total migrants to as little as 2.2 million total migrants in a single year.

6. 1 . 2. British Aid to and Immigration from South Asia. While Britain, like France, also
adheres to UN Millennium Development Goals as a part of its strategy for aid allocation,
Britain does not focus its aid on a select number of countries as does France (Feikert
Ahalt 2 0 1 1 ) . For the selected cases, over the period from 1 993 to 20 1 0, Britain
committed an average of $209.7 million (in 20 1 4 US dollars) to India, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka, committing as much as $9 1 7. 8 million (in 20 1 4 US dollars) maximum and as little
as $ 1 . 8 million (in 20 1 4 US dollars) in a single year. From 1 994 to 20 1 1 , the combined
immigration from these three countries to Britain averaged at 1 8 .3 million total migrants,
with yearly migration rates ranging from as low as 1 million to as high as 68 million in a
single year.
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6.2. Observed vs. Predicted Level of Bilateral Immigration in the Context of Britain
and South Asia and France and North Africa: Does the Model Work?
There are a number of ways of testing H 1 with this relatively small subset of data, but it
may be beneficial to first examine how well the predicted values of immigration match
the observed values of immigration for these cases. Doing so can permit easier inference
of the extent to which foreign aid is positively associated with immigration while
controlling for other factors that are likely to have an impact on immigration as well.
Without the assistance of a multivariate model, it is tempting to look, for example, at
Figure 1 3 and declare that bilateral aid commitments at year t-1 from France and Britain
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are clearly associated with greater bilateral immigration from their respective former
colonies at year t. However, when a line of best fit is plotted for each dyad rather than
for the aggregate data, the slope of the regression line for aid and immigration
demonstrates a substantial degree of variance across bilateral relationships. As Figure 1 4
shows, the case o f Britain and Sri Lanka particularly stands out. While the slope o f the
regression line for this particular dyad is negative, the slope is likely influenced by an
outlier year where British aid to Sri Lanka was particularly low relative to other years
included in the data. If this year is excluded, a meaningful relationship between British
aid to and immigration from Sri Lanka appears nonexistent.
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It should not be assumed, however, that a case like Britain and Sri Lanka ought to
necessarily weaken support for H 1 . To the contrary, the models estimated in the previous
section account for a number of factors presumed to have an impact on immigration. One
of these factors in particular is donor per capita GDP . As Figure 1 5 demonstrates, there
is, without exception, a notable positive relationship between greater donor per capita
GDP and recipient migrant inflows. It may be, therefore, that donor wealth is simply a
more relevant predictor of immigration relative to foreign aid. Indeed, when the
standardized regression coefficients (in this case drawn from the quadratic OLS model
from the preceding analysis) are estimated, the comparatively greater impact of per capita
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GDP relative to aid commitments is clear CP

=

0.05 for aid commitments vs. p

=

0. 1 1 for

per capita GDP). Moreover, further comparison of Figure 1 4 to Figure 1 6 demonstrates
that when the predicted level of migrant inflows at year t is plotted by aid commitments
at year t-1 , the slope of aid ' s relationship with immigration per dyad is comparable,
suggesting, in particular, that the relationship between British aid and Sri Lankan
immigration is not really an outlier as one might have originally thought. By accounting
for other factors that may exert a more powerful gravitational pull on immigration (such
as per capita GDP) the observed values of bilateral immigration to Britain from Sri Lanka
are very close to their model predicted values.
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In fact, for this subset of data, the fitted values, overall, match up quite well with the
actual values of bilateral migrant inflows. Figure 1 7 displays the predicted level of
immigration by the observed level of immigration for the six dyads under examination.
Estimating a simple linear model reveals that the slope of the regression line is nearly
equal to 1 (0.93) and that the predicted values, overall, are a good fit for the observed
values (adjusted R2

=

0.9).

6.3. Estimating the Impact ofAid Commitments from Britain vs. France

While it is useful to demonstrate the extent to which the model estimated in the previous
section succeeds in providing relatively accurate fitted values for the dependent variable,
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because I also

am

interested in examining the impact of aid for this particular subset of

cases, it is further worthwhile to model the bilateral impact of donor aid commitments on
migrant inflows for Britain, France, and their respective former colonies. Doing so may
allow for a readier comparison of the extent to which bilateral immigration is uniquely
affected by aid in the context of Britain and South Asia versus France and North Africa.
I therefore estimate three regression models using OLS . For one, I include data for both
Britain and France ' s respective dyadic relationships with their former colonies, while for
the remaining two I divide my data into two subsets--one for Britain and its former
South Asian colonies and the other for France and its former North African colonies
and estimate a model for each subset. In each of the models I include several of the
control variables used in the analysis in the previous section.

6. 3. 1 . Model 1. Table 7 displays the estimates for the first OLS -model. Not shown are a
set of donor and recipient fixed effects. Despite the potential value in controlling for time
variant fixed effects when using time-series panel data, given the limited number of
cases, I did not include year fixed effects since doing so would substantially reduce the
degrees of freedom. I further did not include the lag of the dependent variable on the
right hand side of the equation since doing so might rob other variables of their
significance given the small number of cases. Of course, while including the lag of the
dependent variable in the equation may help to reduce serial dependence, a Durbin
Watson test reveals that this variable' s exclusion, though leaving the model with a slight
degree of positive serial correlation (DW

=

1 . 77; p

<

0.00 1 ), does not incur a level of

serial correlation large enough to interfere with model inference (see Durbin and Watson
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TABLE 7 .
OLS MODEL RESULTS

Britain and South Asia; France and North Africa
Bilateral Characteristics

Aid Commitments
Common Language

Model Estimates

0 .09 (0.06)
1 .3 5 (0.24)*

Donor Characteristics

Migration Policy Restrictiveness
GDP/capita
Unemployment Rate

-0.02 (0.02)
7 . 3 (0 .64)*
0.07 (0.03)*

Recipient Characteristics

Severity of Civil Conflict
Democracy

-0 .002 (0.02)
0.28 (0 . 1 1 ) *

Model Summary

98
Dyad-Years
0.91
Adjusted R 2
Notes: Cell entries are OLS coefficients. Classic standard errors
are (in parentheses). Intercept and donor and recipient dummies
not shown. See Figure H in the appendix.
*p < 0.05 .

1 97 1 ). The model, overall, appears to perform well with a statistically significant F and
an adjusted R2 of 0.9 1 .
While the analysis of the relationship between bilateral aid and bilateral migrant
inflows in the previous section revealed a statistically significant positive association
between an increase in bilateral aid commitments and bilateral immigration, for this
smaller set of cases, the impact of aid fails to rej ect the null hypothesis. Though its
regression coefficient is positive, it falls just short of moderate significance (p

=

0. 1 1 ) .

Migration policy restrictiveness and the severity of recipient civil conflict also fail
to have a meaningful impact. The latter likely fails to have an effect because there is very
little variance in the severity of civil conflict per recipient over the time included in this
analysis-excepting Algeria and Pakistan where the severity of civil conflict ranged from
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0 to 4 and 0 to 6 respectively. In Sri Lanka, which has been enduring a bloody civil war,
the level of civil conflict has steadily remained at 5 , while in India, the level of civil
conflict has ranged from 7 to 1 0. Meanwhile, in both Morocco and Tunisia the severity
of civil conflict has remained at 0.
Regarding migration policy restrictiveness, reasons why restrictions on
immigration fail to have a significant impact are discussed later in this chapter.
As for the factors that do have a significant impact, donor per capita GDP, the
donor' s unemployment rate (unexpectedly, just as it was in the preceding analysis), a
democratic political regime in the recipient, and sharing a common language all have a
positive association with immigration.

6. 3. 2. Model 2 vs. Model 3. While the impact of bilateral aid failed to reach statistical
significance in the above analysis, when a similar model is estimated for only Britain and
its dyadic relationship with its former South Asian colonies and for only France and its
dyadic relationship with its former North African colonies, a notable difference in the
impact of British versus French aid is apparent. While British aid to India, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka has a statistically significant and positive estimated effect on bilateral
immigration from these countries to Britain, the estimated effect of French aid to Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia on immigration from these countries to France fails to reach
statistical significance.
B esides the positive impact of aid in the British model, British per capita GDP, a
shared language with recipients (namely, with India and Pakistan) and a democratic
political regime in recipients (India had a democratic regime for the entire period under
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TABLE S .
OLS MODEL RESULTS

Britain and South Asia
Bilateral Characteristics

Model Estimates

0.2 (0. 1 ) *
1 .09 (0.35)*

Aid Commitments
Common Language
Donor Characteristics

0 .003 (0.04)
7.08 ( 1 .05)*
0.07 (0.05)

Migration Policy Restrictiveness
GDP/capita
Unemployment Rate
Recipient Characteristics

-0.04 (0.03)
0 .29 (0 . 1 3) *

Severity of Civil Conflict
Democracy
Model Summary

50
Dyad-Years
2
0.92
Adjusted R
Notes: Cell entries are OLS coefficients. Classic standard errors
are (in parentheses). Intercept and recipient dummies not shown.
See Figure H in the appendix.
* < 0.05 .

TABLE 9 .
OLS MODEL RESULTS

France and North Africa
Bilateral Characteristics

Aid Commitments

Model Estimates

-4. 1 8e-03 (8 .25e-02)

Donor Characteristics

Migration Policy Restrictiveness
GDP/capita
Unemployment Rate

-2.42e-02 (2.83e-02)
5 .73 ( 1 .35)*
1 .75e-04 (4.85e-02)

Recipient Characteristics

Severity of Civil Conflict

1 .5 6e-02 (3 .09e-02)

Model Summary

48
Dyad-Years
2
0.88
Adjusted R
Notes: Cell entries are OLS coefficients. Classic standard errors
are (in parentheses) . Intercept and recipient dummies not shown.
See Figure H in the appendix.
*p

<

0 .05 .
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OLS AND TOBIT COEFFICIENT PLOTS ( SEE TABLES 7, 8, AND 9)

analysis; however, Pakistan and Sri Lanka experienced fluctuation in their political
regime type) also are associated with greater bilateral immigration to Britain.
Meanwhile, for the French model only French per capita GDP has a positive and
statistically significant effect on bilateral immigration from each of its North African aid
recipients.
For both models, recipient fixed effects are included; though the results are not
shown. For France and its former colonies, control variables for the political regime of
the recipients and whether France and its former colonies share a common language is
dropped from the analysis since all the recipients are non-democracies and all share a
common language with France. The British model ' s performance was comparatively
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better than France ' s with an adjusted R2 of 0.92 in the case of the former as opposed to
0 . 8 8 in the case of the latter. For a visual comparison of the three models estimated
above, see Figure 1 8 .

6. 3. 3. The Variability ofAid 's Impact on Immigration. Why does aid seem to have a
statistically significant positive impact on immigration in the context of Britain and its
former South Asian colonies while it fails to have a significant impact in the context of
France and its former North African colonies? Without a direct way to gage the extent to
which citizens of these countries factor aid commitments into their estimation of the costs
and benefits of immigrating it is hard to answer this question with any certainty.
Nevertheless, it can be said with (some) certainty that if variability in aid' s impact
exists within this subset of cases, it may exist within a larger set of cases as well. There
is nothing shocking about this idea. Within any set of observations there is an inherent
degree of variability, and though statistical analysis can reveal larger trends, divergent
cases should never surprise. Both aid commitments and immigration are examples of
human behavior-the former is the result of human decisions to allocate monetary
resources while the latter is the result of human decisions to move across geographical
and national boundaries. Predicting human behavior is fraught with uncertainty due to
the complexity of decision-making at the individual level.
This theoretically unsatisfying answer might suggest complacency with
unexplained variability, but it should rather serve as a challenge for future researchers to
better explain why bilateral aid might account for variance in bilateral migrant inflows in
some cases while failing to do so in others. An answer to this question is not clear from,
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and is further beyond the scope of, this analysis. However, it is possible to hazard a
guess that because France is more targeted in its aid compared to Britain (especially when
it comes to France' s former colonies), the effect of French aid to its former North African
colonies is less likely to result in an increase in immigration from these countries into
France; although, more work needs to be done to give this speculation greater
explanatory weight.

6. 3. 4. Here 's the Pull; Where 's the Pushback? The influence of certain other factors
appear to have a much less meaningful impact for these selected cases compared to their
impact when a substantially larger dataset is analyzed. Donor migration policy
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restrictiveness, for example, has a miniscule effect on immigration per dyad according to
the three OLS models estimated above. In fact, Figure 1 9 suggests that for Britain and its
former South Asian colonies, an increase in the restrictiveness of Britain' s immigration
laws appears to have a slight positive association with immigration. Meanwhile, for
France and its former North African colonies the relationship between migration policy
restrictiveness and bilateral immigration is nearly flat. Why is it that pull factors (such as
donor aid commitments and donor per capita GDP in the case of Britain and its
relationships with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; and per capita GDP in the case of
France and its relationships with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) have a significant
impact on immigration while factors that would be expected to have a negative impact on
immigration (especially donor immigration policy) lack a significant effect?
The fact that an increase in the restrictiveness of Britain and France' s immigration
laws failed to have a significant impact on migrant inflows is indication that the marginal
impact of aid on immigration as migration policy restrictiveness varies is unlikely to be
much impacted by the passage of stricter immigration laws. In the case of France and its
dyadic relationships with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, bilateral aid has no statistically
significant impact on immigration anyway, which means any variability in aid' s marginal
effect would be unlikely to matter much, if at all.
Within the context of this subset of cases, one likely reason why legislative
barriers against immigration failed to have an impact is the highly generalized n ature of
immigration policy in both Britain and France. A survey of maj or pieces of immigration
legislation passed in both countries suggests that British and French policymakers are apt
to pass immigration laws that are more sweeping, rather than focused, in scope-at least
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in terms of nationalities targeted. 1 In 1 996, for example, British lawmakers passed the
1 996 Asylum and Immigration Act, which eliminated the need for police and
immigration officers to obtain a warrant for the arrest of individuals suspected of
committing immigration offences. Furthermore, in 2005 a law went into effect in Britain
requiring applicants for naturalization to both pass a test about "life in the UK" and
demonstrate competency in the English language. In 2007, the requirement for taking
this test was expanded to include those seeking permanent residence. Meanwhile, in
France, a law was passed in 1 997 that reinforced the police' s power to control
immigration at its border. And in 2007, a law was passed that required family
reunification applicants to take a test in their country of residence on French values and
the French language.
Though these laws vary in their purpose, they all share a common thread: they
broadly target all foreigners; not particular nationalities. Namely, in the context of this
subset of cases, France and Britain, from 1 993 to 20 1 0, did not pass any laws that were
intended to restrict or relax immigration from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (in the case
of the former) or from India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (in the case of the latter), which
may explain why variation in the restrictiveness these countries' immigration policies
failed to have an effect on immigration within the context of this narrow set of cases.

6.4. What Do These Cases Ultimately Say about the Relationship between Aid and
Immigration?
This chapter' s primary motivation is to examine the relationship between aid and

1

Laws (and their descriptions) passed in each country were cited from the DEMIG Policy dataset.
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immigration in the context of a narrower set of cases, thereby allowing for an assessment
of the ability of the large N model estimated in the previous quantitative analysis to offer
fitted values for immigration that correspond well with the observed values. In short, the
model appears to offer predictions consistent with the actual values for the dependent
variable, at least in the context of Britain and a selection of its former South Asian
colonies and in the context of France and a selection of its former North African colonies.
However, further analysis using data from only this subset of cases reveals some
variability in the consistency of bilateral aid ' s ability to account for some of the variance
in bilateral immigration: while aid seems to have a positive impact on immigration in the
context of Britain and its relationships with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, aid fails to
have a statistically significant impact in the context of France and its relationships with
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. This variability may, in part, explain why the estimated
coefficient for aid ' s impact on immigration, ceteris paribus, is so small. In fact, an as yet
discussed qualification of these findings is that the practical significance of aid' s positive
pull on immigration remains unclear. While, by and large, bilateral aid' s modeled impact
on bilateral migrant inflows is both positive and statistically significant, exponentiation of
the results (both aid and immigration were log transformed) suggests that a $ 1 . 7 million
increase in bilateral aid commitments for a given year is associated with an increase in
bilateral immigration by about 73 migrants (+/- 1 0) the following year. Compare this
result to the impact of per capita GDP. An increase in donor GDP by only about $2. 70
per capita for a given year is associated with an increase in bilateral immigration by about
3 ,320 migrants (+/- 1 ,246) the following year, all else being equal. While the impact of
aid seems comparatively small relative to the impact of donor GDP per capita, the
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variability in aid' s significant impact across cases suggested by the analysis of British
versus French aid advises caution against assuming that aid ' s impact will always be
relatively small. To the contrary, in the case of Britain and its bilateral relationships with
its former South Asian colonies, the estimated impact of a $ 1 . 7 million increase in
bilateral aid in a given year is associated with an increase in bilateral immigration by 22 1
migrants ( +/- 1 0 1 ) the following year. These rates are, by no means, substantial, but they
differ sharply from the estimated impact of aid for the larger set of cases included in the
previous analysis. Aid' s impact, therefore, should not be considered a given; however,
neither should it be ignored.
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
7. 1.

Rationale and Contribution to Research

Not until recently has the impact of immigration on donors' decisions to allocate greater
aid been addressed in the literature. Bermeo and Leblang (20 1 5) recently examined the
hypothesis that donor countries increase bilateral aid commitments to migrant sending
countries in response to an increase in immigration from those countries. The authors
speculate that policymakers, under the assumption that aid is a reliable tool for promoting
improved economic conditions in aid recipients, view increasing bilateral aid as a
potential means for curbing unwanted immigration. Though they find robust support for
this hypothesis, Bermeo and Leblang (20 1 5) give the question of whether this strategy
accomplishes the goal of reducing immigration only passing consideration. They, like
many scholars, argued that using foreign aid as a policy tool for curbing immigration is
unlikely to succeed (at least in the short-term). However, this perspective, though
common, has to date been founded upon little more than speculation-albeit reasonable
speculation-but little systematic empirical analysis. Moreover, entirely missing from
the literature is a consideration of aid' s potentially positive pull on immigration: aid may
function as a signal to residents in aid recipients of donor wealth, and an increase in aid
could conceivably make the donor appear like a more appealing destination. This study
attempts to fill this gap in the literature.

7.2. Summary of Methods and Findings
By estimating a "gravity-type" equation for dyadic time-series panel data, it was possible
to model the impact of bilateral aid commitments on immigration while controlling for
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other relevant predictors of bilateral migrant flows as well as accounting for time
invariant and time-variant fixed effects. Using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and
Tobit estimation, analysis found a positive relationship between the natural log of (one
plus) bilateral aid commitments at year t-1 and the natural log of (one plus) bilateral
migrant inflows at year t. These results support the theory that aid may function as a
signal of greater donor wealth and thus may attract greater numbers of migrants from an
aid recipient, ceteris paribus. However, additional analysis revealed that aid and
immigration may have an upside-down-J curvilinear relationship. The results from a
model that assumes immigration is a quadratic function of bilateral aid were statistically
significant: the effect of bilateral aid was positive, but the effect of the squared value of
aid was negative.
In addition to examining the impact of aid on immigration, this study also
considered whether aid' s impact might be contingent upon a number of factors associated
with donor-recipient ties and recipient regime characteristics. However, further analysis
failed to find a significant interaction effect between bilateral aid and donor-recipient
commonalities such as a common language and past colonial ties, suggesting that aid' s
positive pull is not contingent on the presence of such bilateral links. Continued analysis
also failed to find a significant interaction effect between aid and a recipient' s political
regime, further indicating that when a recipient is a democracy, aid has no additive
positive impact on immigration.
Further exploration of whether aid can "defy gravity" suggested that aid ' s pull is
diminished (though not overly so) when donors increase the restrictiveness of their
immigration policies, and it is diminished (though not overly so) when there is greater
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bilateral distance between donor and recipient. However, though the marginal impact of
aid appeared to slightly decline as immigration restrictions increased and when bilateral
distance was greater, the margin of error varied substantially, warranting caution in
interpreting the results. Similarly, the negative marginal effect of both immigration
policy restrictiveness and bilateral distance seemed to increase as aid commitments
increased, but, again, there was a great deal of variance in aid' s impact on these
variable ' s marginal effects.
Further insight was gleaned by taking a close look at a selection of cases from the
larger dyadic panel dataset. An examination of the comparability of the quadratic
model' s fitted values with observed values for bilateral immigration for Britain and its
dyadic relationships with three of its former South Asian colonies (India, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka) and for France and its dyadic relationships with three of its former North
African colonies (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) suggested that the model performed
relatively well. However, additional analysis of the relationship between aid and
immigration, ceteris paribus, for this subset of cases revealed significant variability in
aid ' s impact on immigration. While British aid to India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
appeared to have a positive impact on bilateral migrant inflows, French aid to Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia had no such effect.

7. 3. Discussion and Implication of Findings

7. 3. 1 . Why a CunJilinear Relationship ? The results from this study suggest a number of
important implications, both for researchers and for policymakers. First, the finding that
aid may have a curvilinear relationship with immigration raises a number of questions
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that future research will need to explore. Why does aid' s positive pull on bilateral
migrant inflows diminish and eventually reverse as aid commitments increase? Earlier in
this study, two possible answers to this question were offered.
On the one hand, it could be that aid ' s curvilinear impact on immigration is
merely the result of bilateral migrant inflows reaching an upper threshold. Each country
has only a limited pool of potential emigrants, and it could be that as this pool shallows,
the rate of out-migration necessarily slows. Once this limit is reached, even if bilateral
aid commitments increase, bilateral immigration will not follow suit.
On the other hand, it may be that donors, because they want a sensible return on
investment, will commit greater amounts of aid to countries that are likely to make good
use of that aid. If good use of aid translates into more noticeable improvements in
economic, social, and living conditions, the pull of aid may be washed out as would-be
migrants now have less incentive to leave their home country.
At any rate, this analysis alone is does not offer sufficient evidence to support
either of these accounts, nor does it exclude other possible explanations. Future research
will need to address this issue, not only for the sake of intellectual curiosity, but also
because policymakers have an obvious interest in understanding the unique impact that
aid commitments have on bilateral immigration.

7. 3.2. Is A id 's Positive Pull a Given? Examination of the relationship between aid and
immigration for Britain and a selection of its aid recipients and for France and a selection
of its aid recipients reveals some inconsistencies in aid' s impact. Why does aid appear to
have a significant pull on immigration in the case of the former and lack a significant
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effect in the case of the latter? This is an important question for future research since
having an explanation for under what conditions a phenomenon is likely and unlikely to
occur makes for a more robust theoretical account. Such an account would further have
useful policy implications since donors have an interest in knowing what. effects bilateral
aid is likely to have in varying contexts.

7.3.3. Is Aid 's Positive Pull on Immigration ofPractical Consequence ? The question of
whether aid' s positive impact on immigration is of much material consequence is an
especially important concern of policymakers. As was discussed in a preceding section,
when the pull of aid is compared to the pull of other factors (namely, donor per capita
GDP), aid' s impact is relatively small. Thus, while aid ' s estimated effect on bilateral
migrant inflows is statistically significant, its real world significance is uricertain. If an
increase in aid is unlikely to result in an increase in migrant inflows by anything
resembling a staggering magnitude, policymakers may not have much cause to be
practically concerned about aid having the opposite effect from its original intent: though
aid may lead to an increase in bilateral immigration, rather than a decrease, the expected
increase may not be substantial enough to warrant reducing bilateral aid. However, while
an increase in bilateral aid may have a relatively small positive impact on immigration
from a single recipient, a small increase in immigration from multiple countries at once
would represent a total increase in immigration that is much more substantial. Thus, the
practical significance of aid' s impact is contingent upon the scale at which aid' s impact is
considered. If considered on a case by case basis, the impact of aid may be relatively
small, but if considered in aggregate, its effect may be of material significance.
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It should be noted, however, that outside of the impact of aid on immigration, the
consequences of greater rates of immigration for donors is not considered here. It is not
assumed by this study that greater levels of immigration incurred by an increase in
bilateral aid is of either negative or positive consequence for donors overall. Though
research suggests that immigration is not utterly detrimental to immigrant receiving
countries (it even may be beneficial), a consideration of whether or how policymakers
ought to adjust aid commitments in pursuit of national self-interest as it relates to
immigration (however that may be defined) is beyond the scope of this analysis.

7.4. Conclusion
Though the findings from this study support the theory that foreign aid may function as a
signal of donor wealth and thus result in greater immigration from aid recipients in
response to an increase in bilateral aid, more work needs to be done to parse out the finer
details of aid' s relationship with immigration. Why does the positive pull of aid diminish
and eventually reverse as bilateral aid increases? Under what conditions is aid' s impact
likely to be of practical significance? There also is the as yet unaddressed question of
whether more recent developments in donor countries' attitudes toward maj ority Muslim
countries have impacted donors' migration policies and their decisions to allocate aid
toward these countries.
The need for further research, therefore, is clear. Results from individual studies
in any discipline should never be given the weight of scholarly consensus. Because this
analysis represents the first attempt to systematically examine the impact of bilateral aid
on bilateral immigration, the conclusions reached herein should not have the final word in
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the debate regarding the usefulness of aid as a policy tool for curbing the demand for
immigration. Thus, it is this author' s hope that this study, though the first attempt to
examine this phenomenon, will not be the last.
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8. APPENDIX
8.1.

Summary Statistics and Sample
TABLE 1 0.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Bilateral Aid Commitments
Migrant Inflows

(in millions of 20 1 4 US $)

(in thousands of migrants)

Weighted Bilateral Distance

(in km)

Donor Unemployment Rate
Donor GDP (in millions of 2005 US $)
Donor Population (in millions)
Donor Migration Policy Restrictiveness

Min.

l '' Q

Med.

Mean

3'd Q

0

0.68

4.57

3 5 .96

23.06

3465

0

19

1 17

2020

747

27 1 ,400

53.59

4,924

7 ,649

7 ,6 1 9

9,862

1 9, 1 1 0

Max.

2.1

4.7

6.8

7.14

8.8

21.1

70,390

279,900

973 , 1 00

1 ,8 96,000

1 ,863 ,000

1 3 , 1 40,000

3 .62

8.08

3 1 .28

5 7 .04

62.84

310

2

3

4

10

2

8

10

0

10

0

Recipient Polity 2 Score

-10

-4

5

Recipient Civil Conflict

0

0

0

8. 1 . 1 . Aid Donors. Austria, Australia, B elgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.

8. 1 . 2. Aid Recipients. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia,
Azerbaij an, Bahrain, Bangladesh, B elarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Caho Verde, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China (People's Republic of), Chinese
Taipei, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus,
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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8.2. Tools Used for Data Analysis
Statistical analysis was conducted using R (version 3 .3 .0, "Supposedly Educational") .
Functions in the following R packages were used in model estimation: plm, lmtest, and
VGAM. And the following packages were used for data visualization: ggplot2 and
mgcv.
R is collaborative and open source. Numerous individuals are responsible for the
development of these packages, and references for each can be found among the other
references cited for this paper in the references section.

8.3. About the Estimation of Heteroscedasticity-Robust Standard Errors in R
While some types of statistical software provide the prerequisite tools for estimating
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors with the degrees of freedom adjustment outlined
by Stock and Watson (2008), no such tool has been developed for R. However, R' s
flexible environment makes it fairly easy to compute degrees of freedom adjusted
clustered standard errors by using existing packages and tools already available in R.
After estimation of a linear model, the following degrees of freedom adjustment

(dfa) for the robust standard errors can be computed:

dfa

= ((

G
G

) ((N - 1))
- 1) (N
- K)

G is the number of clustered groups in the dataset (in this case, dyads), N is the number of
observations, and K is the number of variables (including the intercept and fixed effects)
included in model estimation. Once computed, this degrees of freedom adjustment can
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be simply multiplied by the robust covariance matrix of parameters estimable using the
vcovHC() function in the plm package (see Zeileis 2004), the product of which is a
degrees of freedom adjusted robust covariance matrix where the heteroscedasticity-robust
clustered standard errors are the square root of the diagonal elements of the matrix.
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